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Abstract:  
It is widely acknowledged that multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) contribute to aid 
effectiveness. This paper challenges this assertion through assessing the aid effectiveness 
of the Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The paper makes four key arguments. First, 
political relations between recipient and donor countries are vital in the functioning of 
MDTFs. Second, the design of MDTFs affects the delivery and functioning of the trust 
fund. Third, whilst the legitimacy of national governments in fragile states is often contested, 
targeting legitimate and credible institutions can offer tangible and life changing results. 
Fourth, MDTFs focusing on the recovery of key sectors such as water, sanitation and energy 
have direct impacts to economic recovery and people’s lives. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Multi-donor  trust  funds  (MDTFs)  are  a  prevalent  aid  mechanism  in  international 
development. In particular, MDTFs are often predominant in fragile states. This raises a 
number of questions such as how do MDTFs contribute to aid effectiveness? Under what 
conditions can MDTFs in fragile states contribute to aid effectiveness? Fragile states are an 
eminent challenge of international development policy. They are more susceptible to 
instability, with potential regional and global consequences (OECD, 2013). High levels of 
poverty, inequality and vulnerability are key deﬁning features of fragile states. Thus, the key 
focus of international development is to avoid the degeneration of fragile states into state 
failure. 
 
Recent studies indicate the changing face of fragility in which addressing fragility as a deeply 
political issue centred on the social contract between the state and society is critical (OECD, 
2013). In particular, it is essential to improve the capacity of the state to deliver public goods 
and services to its citizens. This approach compels international development assistance to 
focus on the re-establishment and reinforcement of the social contract, a phenomenon 
that brings mutual trust and credibility between the state and society. 
 
Aid effectiveness and improving the impact of aid, especially in fragile and conﬂict affected 
states has become a major policy issue for many international development organisations 
and bilateral donors (Barakat et al., 2011). Delivering aid in fragile contexts is difﬁcult and 
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risky as most recipient countries are characterised by weak state policies, weak institutions, 
and high incidences of the relapse of conﬂict and instability. Despite these risks, ﬁnancial 
analysis reveal that since 2000, aid volumes have increased with fragile and conﬂict 
affected states receiving a substantial amount (Chapman & Vaillant, 2010). In this context, 
what form of aid instrument is prevalent in fragile states? 
 
The central ﬁnancing vehicle increasingly in use in fragile and conﬂict affected situations 
are MDTFs (World Bank, 2011). By deﬁnition, trust funds are vehicles of channelling aid 
resources from governmental and non-governmental donors, administered by a trustee 
organisation (IEG (Independent Evaluation Group), 2011). Donor organisations and 
recipient countries agree on who administers and manages the fund. The complexity of 
challenges in post-crisis situations calls for collective engagement as no single agency can 
provide adequate support (OECD, 2012). MDTFs provide an avenue for such collective 
engagement. At the centre of the emergency of MDTFs as a popular aid ﬁnancing mechanism 
is the push to enhance aid effectiveness amongst the international community (Barakat et 
al., 2011). 
 
International engagement in fragile states involves dealing with uncertainty, ﬂuidity and high 
risk. In such high risk environments, the international community is prone to relying on 
bilateral and multilateral organisations to perform functions normally performed by the state 
as a way of dissociating with corrupt use of resources and violence unleashing regimes 
(World Bank, 2011). Here, the goal is to use credible, less risky systems and avoiding 
parallel systems that further weaken or undermine the state. High risk environments are 
difﬁcult to engage as they require extensive compromise in designing aid mechanisms. 
MDTFs have been used as a risk adverse mechanism in high risk environments. The 
2011 World Development Report argues that MDTFs improve the transparency of donor 
investments, reduce transaction costs, ensure greater coherence with national planning and 
provide a platform for resource mobilisation, donor coordination and dialogue with national 
authorities (World Bank, 2011). Thus, MDTFs are an important tool of achieving aid 
effectiveness. 
 
Zimbabwe  is  a  fragile  state,1   and  the  international  donor  community’s  collective 
response revolves around ﬁve MDTFs, namely, the Education Transition Fund, and Health 
Transition Fund (both UNICEF managed), Analytical Multi-donor Trust Fund and Results-
based Financing Trust Fund (both World Bank managed) and the Zimbabwe Multi-donor 
Trust Fund (Zim-Fund) (African Development Bank managed). The purpose of this article is 
to determine the Zim-Fund adherence to Paris Declaration principles on aid effectiveness. 
The Paris Declaration is recognised for its provision for a practical and action-oriented 
roadmap, and a clear monitoring framework to track the progress with indicators and 
targets (Kim & Lee, 2013). This is performed primarily for two reasons. First, the MDTFs 
are widely believed as aid instruments that enhances aid effectiveness in fragile states 
(World Bank, 2011; Barakat et al., 2011). Using the Paris Declaration principles, this article 
                                                          
1 On the World Bank’s Country and Policy Institutional Assessment index, Zimbabwe is classified a fragile state with its ranking falling 
from 3.3 in 1999 to 1.76 in 2007 and 1.67 in 2008 before recovering to 2.4 in 2011. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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challenges this assertion through assessing the aid effectiveness of the Zim-Fund. The article 
argues that, the institutional structure of a trust fund, and politics are important factors that 
determine the aid effectiveness of a trust fund. Second, it is vital that MDTFs be assessed not 
in general but with context speciﬁcity. In this regard, the unique nature of fragility in 
Zimbabwe provides vital insights to MDTF literature. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 explains the currency of MDTFs in 
mainstream development thinking and practice. Section 3 reviews the aid effectiveness 
debate. In Section 4, the article explains the context of Zimbabwe’s development and aid 
dynamics. A brief overview of the Zim-Fund is proffered in Section 5 with Section 6 
outlining the research methodology. Section 7 presents and discusses the research ﬁndings 
while Section 8 concludes the article. 
 
2 MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUNDS 
Multi-donor trust funds have quickly become one of the most prominent aid modalities 
(Barakat et al., 2011). There are primarily two types of MDTFs, namely, government- 
managed and donor-managed. The former are managed by government arms or agencies 
tasked with both fund management and implementation of fund projects. In practice, 
government-managed trust funds are few, as MDTFs are normally used in situations where 
government and state capacity is considered weak. Zimbabwe has ﬁve operational MDTFs, 
all of them donor-managed. However, the contribution of MDTFs in improving aid 
effectiveness is contested in development theory and practice. This is despite the overall 
conception that in fragile states, MDTFs contribute signiﬁcantly to aid effectiveness. 
According to Feeny and McGillivray (2009), MDTFs are an important step in reducing 
transaction costs of aid delivery and adhering to the Paris Declaration. Basing on a study in 
the West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor (Timor-Leste) and 
Afghanistan, Schiavo-Campo (2003) concludes that MDTFs contribute to aid effectiveness 
in situations characterised by agreed programmes of reconstruction activities, ownership by 
both government and donors, transparency and citizens’ voice. In this regard, it is crucial 
to assess the design, management, accountability and ownership of MDTF programmes by 
government and donors. 
 
In donor-managed MDTFs, many donors perceive that there are very limited 
opportunities for recipient governments to take effective ownership of a development 
agenda and provide a voice and coordination that is required to deliver on alignment and 
harmonisation (Manuel et al., 2012). Donor-managed MDTFs have challenges in adhering 
to aid effectiveness principles of ownership and alignment. Conversely, recipient 
government-managed MDTFs have difﬁculties in terms of management for results as the 
state is often weak and under-capacitated to perform such functions. Using cross-country 
research evidence from three fragile states Coppin (2012) ﬁnds that MDTFs in general have 
the potential to strengthen aid effectiveness although aid effectiveness beneﬁts do not 
accrue automatically. Following this argument, arriving at conclusions about the aid 
effectiveness of MDTFs is a long process that requires a considerable period of analysis. 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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3 AID EFFECTIVENESS: FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
Aid effectiveness is a central theme in international development policy and practice. Over the 
last decade, propelled by aid effectiveness literature, the aid sector has increasingly 
strengthened its focus on results (Koster & Holvoet, 2012). In principle, the main purpose of 
aid effectiveness is contribution to poverty reduction and economic growth. However, aid’s  
effectiveness  in  raising  economic  growth  and  reducing  poverty  is  a  topic  of long-
standing and rigorous debate amongst researchers (Addison et al., 2005). There is extant 
literature on both the afﬁrmative and negative as discussed in ensuing paragraphs. At the 
core of the aid effectiveness agenda is the ability of recipient countries to take ownership 
and responsibility in devising poverty reduction development strategies and a global 
commitment to tangible target-led development results (Mawdsley et al., 2013). Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers and Millennium Development Goals are development packages 
designed and intended to improve aid effectiveness. Despite large aid volumes being 
channelled to fragile states, recipient countries often lack the absorptive capacity to 
efﬁciently use aid ﬂows (Feeny & McGillivray, 2009). Thus, a considerable amount of aid 
ﬂows can be wasted. Poverty reduction development strategies and the capacity of the state 
to manage aid ﬂows are important indicators of aid effectiveness. 
 
The widely used measure of aid effectiveness is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
which outlined the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for 
results and mutual accountability as broad aims of the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
principles are deﬁned in Table 1. 
 
The central empirical question is how the principles outlined in Table 1 are implemented and 
play out in practice. The Paris Declaration provides a framework to enable evidence- based 
dialogue to improve aid practices and its impact on development on the ground (Killen & 
Rogerson, 2010). This article selects 20 indicators of the principles outlined in Table 1 based 
on partner commitments and progress indicators outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (as explained in Section 6). This selection is informed by progress indicators 
showing partner commitments, which can be measured nationally. Improving aid 
effectiveness in fragile states entails external actors focusing on state building as a central 
objective (OECD/DAC, 2007). This transacts in the development of pro-poor development 
strategies aimed at transforming people’s lives through responsive state institutions. 
 
The article uses the Paris Declaration as a framework of analysis for speciﬁcally three 
reasons. First, the Paris Declaration principles are widely used as indicators of aid effectiveness 
(Rogerson, 2005; Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011; Koster & Holvoet, 2012). Second, the 
MDTFs are viewed as an important step in adhering to Paris Declaration principles (Feeny &  
McGillivray,  2009).  Third,  the  Zim-Fund  is a  vehicle that aims  at  enhancing  aid 
effectiveness through harnessing donors towards a common aid delivery channel. 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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4 ZIMBABWE’S DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT AND AID DYNAMICS 
For  the  second  decade  running,  the  role  and  capacity  of  the  Zimbabwean  state  in 
international aid management and public service delivery is weak (UNDP, 2009, 2010). 
Thus, the international community (donors) has been helping the state perform its basic 
functions of public service delivery. There are three key events, which contributed to the 
weakening of the state’s role in the development process and changing development 
context and aid dynamics in Zimbabwe. These are the huge unbudgeted gratuities to war 
veterans in 1997 triggering the Zimbabwean dollar to lose half of its value on a single day 
(ICG (International Crisis Group), 2004); economic destabilisation following the chaotic 
and contested fast track land reform programme (beginning 2001) (Dore, 2009) and the 
formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The 
Zimbabwean state responded by being oppressive disregarding the rule of law, human rights 
and media freedom (OSISA, 2007). These developments prompted donors to opt for non-
state actors as recipients in channelling aid. Thus, at the turn of the millennium, 
Zimbabwe entered a period of unprecedented socio-economic and political crisis. 
 
The response of the Zimbabwean state to the looming crisis brought signiﬁcant and 
drastic changes to aid delivery and management in the country. On the other hand, the US 
Government enacted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 
2001 aimed at providing a ‘transition to democracy and promoting economic recovery in 
Zimbabwe’ (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001). The ZIDERA Act 
empowered the US Government and its representatives to vote in multi- lateral ﬁnancial 
institutions (MFIs) against any extension of loans, credit, or guarantee to the Government of 
Zimbabwe and any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by Zimbabwe to USA 
or any MFIs. Zimbabwe became ineligible to access any development ﬁnance from the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Further, the US Government cancelled Ofﬁcial Development 
Assistance (ODA) to the Government of Zimbabwe preferring funding non-governmental 
organisations involved in governance, democracy and humanitarian work (UNDP, 2009). 
The European Council Decision (2002/145 CFSP) of  18  February  2002  introduced  
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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restrictive  measures  against  the  Government  of Zimbabwe.2  As a result, European 
donors evaded the Government of Zimbabwe and provided ODA through non-state actors. 
 
The economic crisis severely eroded the country’s development gains. Zimbabwe’s gross 
domestic product declined by 37 per cent between 1998 and 2006 (Zimbabwe Institute, 
2007: 37). By 2006, life expectancy had dropped to the lowest in the whole world: 34 
years for women and 37 years for men (UNDP, 2008). Beginning 2008, the Zimbabwean 
dollar lost its value completely. To support the said assertion, by July 2008, a loaf of 
bread was costing nearly ZW$100 billion (Dore, 2009: 18). The delivery of public services 
reached near collapse as 60 000 of the 140 000 teachers remained at their posts and 30 per 
cent of government health workers were still at their posts (Dore, 2009). Amid public 
service delivery collapse, a widespread and endemic cholera broke out claiming over 
4000 lives (ICG (International Crisis Group), 2009). Mbeki, (2009: 101) argues that the 
Zimbabwean case was the making of a failed African state in which everything had gone 
wrong—economics, politics, foreign policy and public health to the detriment of the 
Zimbabwean people. 
 
With little access to development ﬁnancing, isolated from the international community, ruled 
by a repressive regime, distrusted by citizens and challenged by the MDC—the 
Zimbabwean state was at its weakest (Muchadenyika, 2013). The harmonised elections 
ushered in a transitional phase guided by the Global Political Agreement,3 and new aid 
modalities emerged. Mbeki (2009) argues that the development conditions facing the 
Inclusive Government were complex as all sectors of the economy had collapsed. Other 
scholars such as Mbeki (2009); Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) and the Failed States 
Index categorised Zimbabwe as a failed state. The Failed States Index ranked Zimbabwe 
second (2009), fourth (2010), sixth (2011), ﬁfth (2012) and 10th (2013). 
 
Because of the political construction of the Inclusive Government (for instance, the rise of MDC 
in government), aid dynamics changed as donors prioritised re-engaging the Government of 
Zimbabwe, though cautiously (Muchadenyika, 2013). The process of state re-engagement in 
aid management resulted in the creation of ﬁve MDTFs, namely, the Health Transition 
Fund, Analytical Multi-donor Trust Fund, Education Transition Fund, the Zim-Fund and 
Results-based Financing Trust Fund.4 These trust funds are ﬁnancing the provision of key 
services such as health, education, electricity, water and sanitation in addition to supporting 
                                                          
2 Council decision premised on violence escalation, intimidation of political opponents, harassment of independent press and 
infringement of the right to freedom of speech, assembly, and association and the violation of norms and standards for free and fair 
elections. Council decision premised on violence escalation, intimidation of political opponents, harassment of independent press and 
infringement of the right to freedom of speech, assembly, and association and the violation of norms and standards for free and fair 
elections. 
3 Signed and entered by the two Movement for Democratic Change formations and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.   
4 Donors involved in these trust funds are UK, Japan, Germany, Netherlands and Finland, and the European Commission, Switzerland 
Development Cooperation Agency, Australian Agency for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency, 
Danish International Development Agency, Department for International Development, Directorate General of International 
Cooperation, European Union, Finnish International Development Agency, German Agency for International Cooperation, Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation, Swedish International Cooperation Agency, United States Agency for International Development 
and the World Bank. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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research and technical assistance and strengthening public management efﬁciency. On 
average, ODA increased during the transition period as reﬂected on Table 2. 
 
The bulk of funds shown in Table 2 were channelled through MDTFs and other non- state 
development actors. This arrangement is against government’s wishes as the government 
‘bemoan the continued bypassing of government budget structures by development 
partners’ who prefer to channel ODA outside government channels (MoF (Ministry of 
Finance), 2013: 121). In other words, donors are still to have conﬁdence in the Government 
of Zimbabwe with regards to international aid management. Non-state actors remain a key 
ﬁnancing vehicle used by donors in funding and assisting government development 
programmes. 
 
In summary, Zimbabwe shows an unusual case of state fragility, which has resulted in the 
setting up of ﬁve MDTFs. Unusual in the sense that countries such as West Bank and Gaza, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor (Timor-Leste), Liberia, South Sudan and Afghanistan 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2003), which have MDTFs have in one way or another been engaged in 
serious armed conﬂict. Further, unlike in many countries where there are operational 
MDTFs as a way of building state capacity, Zimbabwe does not suffer capacity challenges. 
Rather, the Zimbabwean issue is the political stand-off between the government and major 
western nations. It is envisaged that the Zimbabwean case study contribute insights in the 
broader MDTF literature largely due to its unique setting explained in this article. 
 
 
 
5 ZIMBABWE MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND 
The Zim-Fund was created at the request of main donors5 in Zimbabwe and initially 
administered by the World Bank. In May 2010, the group of donors requested the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) to take over the management of the MDTF from the World Bank 
(African Development Bank (AfDB), 2010a). It was argued that the Government of 
Zimbabwe was uncomfortable with the World Bank managing the trust fund hence 
preference of an institution considered ‘neutral’—the African Development Bank. The 
purpose of the Zim-Fund is to contribute to early recovery and development efforts in 
Zimbabwe by mobilising donor resources and promoting donor coordination. The Zim- 
                                                          
5 These are Department for International Development, Swedish International Cooperation Agency, Switzerland Development 
Cooperation Agency, German Development Bank, Australian Agency for International Development, Denmark and Norway. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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Fund focuses on the rehabilitation of water, sanitation and energy infrastructure. The 
governance structure of the Zim-Fund is complex as it consists of a Programme Oversight 
Committee (POC), a Management Unit (MMU), implementing agencies and the AfDB as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
The POC provides the overall oversight functions to the functioning and administration of the 
Zim-Fund. The POC reviews progress and implementation of the Zim-Fund, and it provides 
a platform for dialogue between the government, the AfDB and the Zim-Fund donors 
(African Development Bank (AfDB), 2010b). The POC comprises of two government 
representatives6 and seven participating donor representatives. The MMU is responsible for 
the collection and quality control of speciﬁc project proposals ﬁnanced under the Zim-
Fund, appraisal and processing of these projects, providing the POC with operational and 
ﬁnancial information on the Zim-Fund and facilitating the discussions and decisions of the 
POC (African Development Bank (AfDB), 2010b, 2010c). The AfDB is both the fund manager 
and implementing agency. However, the actual implementation of the Zim-Fund projects is 
performed through two implementing entities contracted by the Government of Zimbabwe. 
One implementing entity has project management experience in water and sanitation and 
the other power supply. The water and sanitation implementing entity is a German ﬁrm 
while the power supply implementing entity is a South African company. 
 
The size of the Zim-Fund is determined by the willingness of donors to contribute over time. 
As of September 2012, donor commitments to the Zim-Fund totalled US$123.47 million, 
with US$101.47 million released to the Zim-Fund account. Two ongoing projects, namely, 
Urgent Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Project (UWSSRP) phase I and 
Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project phase I are at different implementation stages. 
 
                                                          
6Minister of Finance and one minister nominated by government.  
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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UWSSRP phase I is funded to the amount of US$29.65 million supporting urgent 
rehabilitation work and stabilisation of water supply and sanitation services in six 
municipalities of Harare, Chitungwiza, Mutare, Chegutu, Masvingo and Kwekwe. The 
project’s envisaged outcomes are increased reliability, quality and availability of water 
supply, restored wastewater treatment capacity and reduced incidence of cholera and other 
water related diseases. 
 
Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project phase I aims at improving the reliability of power 
supply through the rehabilitation of Hwange Power Station Ash Plant and the sub 
transmission and distribution facilities in the country with a grant of US$35 million. Both 
projects are being developed to the second phase. Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project 
phase II is envisaged to continue with the transmission and distribution network 
rehabilitation and Hwange Ash Plant rehabilitation, and the estimated funding stands at 
US$30 million. The second phase of UWSSRP is under preparation with an estimated 
grant of US$31 million focusing on four municipalities of Harare, Chitungwiza, Ruwa and 
Redcliff. Second phase projects are expected to compliment ﬁrst phase projects. 
 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The researcher identiﬁed the potential interviewees based on association and experience 
with the Zim-Fund projects. Thus, data sources were selected based on purposive sampling. 
There is a deﬁned set of organisations involved in the Zim-Fund, and hence, th  researcher 
selected key informants from that pool. The Zim-Fund, its donors and  partners are the 
core data sources in this article. The article is based on 23 interviews with ofﬁcials drawn 
mainly from the Government of Zimbabwe, the Zim-Fund donors and the AfDB as shown 
on Table 3. The interviewees were selected based on three criteria, namely, those 
managing the trust fund, donors and representatives of government ministries involved in 
the trust fund. The interviews were conducted between 1 June and 1 September 2013. 
 
 
 
An interview guide (Table 4), with open-ended questions coupled with informal probing 
facilitated and guided the discussion. The interview guide had ﬁve deﬁned categories that are 
Paris Declaration principles on aid effectiveness (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, 
mutual accountability and management for results). Four indicators of each principle were 
selected based on the Paris Declaration commitments and indicators. 
 
 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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7 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Ownership 
The Government of Zimbabwe developed a broad-based development strategy called the 
medium-term plan (MTP) (2011–2015) GoZ (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011).7  
 
 
 
The plan is implemented through a total of 79 priority projects with an estimated 
implementation cost of US$18 billion in four thematic areas of infrastructure, economic, 
social, and governance and rights. The government, through the national budget is the main 
ﬁnancier to these projects (MEPIP (Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment 
Promotion), 2012). A government economist argued that ‘the Plan provides a unique way of 
planning and prioritising with little resources’ (Interview, A13). At the same time, ‘donors 
have set up ﬁve multi-donor trust funds as a way of assisting the implementation of the 
MTP’ (Interview, A1). The First Annual MTP Implementation Progress Report singled 
out inadequate ﬁnancial resources as the main constraint to full implementation of the MTP 
projects (MEPIP (Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion), 2012). This is 
despite that there is ‘government realisation that some of the national priorities do not need 
                                                          
7 The key priorities of the plan are infrastructure development, employment creation, human centred development, entrepreneurship 
development, macroeconomic stability, Information and Communication Technology and science and technology development, good 
governance, investment promotion, resource utilisation and poverty reduction (GoZ, 2011). 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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resources’ (Interview, A5). Before the MTP, ‘the Government of Zimbabwe had a tendency 
of producing quality policy documents without consultation, follow-up and feedback 
resulting in limited implementation’ (Interview, A10). However, the government, with 
support from the UNDP produced the ﬁrst plan implementation progress report in 2012, 
which provides a critical assessment of progress and challenges. 
 
The plan was formulated through a highly consultative process that included the 
government, members of parliament, academia, civil society, UN agencies, MFIs and the 
diplomatic community (GoZ (Government of Zimbabwe), 2011). In particular, the 
consolidation of documents presented during consultative meetings and workshops 
provided the basis of the MTP (Interviews, A13 and A8). The plan consultative process 
resulted in the compilation of four drafts, with the prepared zero draft tabled to 
stakeholders  for  conﬁrming  and  commenting  (Interview,  A13).  However,  while  the Zim-
Fund  focuses  on  priorities  in  the  MTP  (as  discussed  under  alignment),  the 
Government of Zimbabwe is not directly involved in the management of the fund. Rather, the 
AfDB is the fund manager with ‘government taking a leadership role in identifying priority 
areas’ (Interview, A14). While the government puts down its requirements, ‘there is evidence 
that government does not have the power to inﬂuence the fund, making the Zim-Fund to 
some extent donor driven’ (Interview, A20). This is largely due to ‘restrictive measures [also 
referred to as sanctions] imposed on the country’s leadership, with donors putting a special 
arrangement [the Zim-Fund] to circumvent these measures’ (Interview, A1). According to 
the principle of ownership, donors should strengthen government capacity in 
implementing and managing development programmes such as the Zim-Fund (Rogerson, 
2005). Conversely, the Zim-Fund implements and manages projects on behalf of the 
government, with donors viewing the Zim-Fund as the government providing a unique and 
complicated situation (Interviews, A1, A3, A5 and A10). 
 
Nonetheless, the POC provides the government with an avenue to inﬂuence and provide 
leadership in the Zim-Fund operations. Despite this caveat, ‘there are POC sessions where the 
MMU reports to a POC composed of donors without proper representation from the 
government side’ (Interview, A20). Further, the two implementing entities report to the 
AfDB (MMU) despite having a contract with the Ministry of Finance. Such arrangement 
makes the Ministry of Finance, government’s representative, ‘to be kind of a sleeping 
partner’ (Interview, A20). As a result, there has been a tendency for lack of programme 
ownership by various government institutions (Interviews, A20 and A21). In other words, the 
Zim-Fund is an aid instrument to cater for the mistrust between government and donors, 
with the mistrust constraining government leadership in the Zim-Fund. Perhaps, this 
explains why seven out of eight government ofﬁcials argued that government had no 
option but to agree to any funding arrangement. 
 
While Zimbabwe has a development strategy that involved a number of development actors 
in its crafting, its implementation has suffered from severe ﬁnancial constraints. Despite 
this, non-state actors through MDTFs have been key ﬁnanciers of programmes supporting 
MTP implementation. The Government of Zimbabwe is in a weak position to inﬂuence the 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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operations of the Zim-Fund. This is partly because the government was in a desperate 
situation hence agreeing to any funding arrangement. However, the government has not 
exhausted all the avenues to exercise its leadership of the Zim-Fund especially informal  
POC and project steering committee meetings. Full government participation in informal 
POC meetings is the key because this is the forum where concrete and detailed discussions 
take place. 
 
7.2 Alignment 
Zimbabwe’s development priorities are laid out in the MTP. Through the plan, the 
Government of Zimbabwe identiﬁed the availability of reliable water and energy supply as 
key economic enablers (GoZ (Government of Zimbabwe), 2011). Thus, the Zim-Fund’s focus 
on water and energy ‘complements government efforts in resuscitating key development 
sectors’ (Interview, A21). Nonetheless, there are challenges of the Zim-Fund alignment at 
lower levels that is local authorities and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority. This is 
evidenced by the fact that ‘of the six local authorities and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority, there is little evidence of infrastructure investments plans outlining  and  
deﬁning  priorities’ (Interviews,  A20,  A14  and  A16).  The  absence  of infrastructure 
investments plan poses risks of non-continuity at the completion of the Zim-Fund projects. 
One can argue that poor alignment to local authority plans affects the sustainability of the 
Zim-Fund projects. 
 
The design and management of projects under the Zim-Fund is complex. The AfDB is the 
fund manager and the bank standard procedures are used. In general, the ‘Bank’s 
procedures are not designed for emergency interventions, since they are slow and have 
little ﬂexibility for fast reaction’ (Interview, A20). Donors give funds to the AfDB to 
manage the Zim-Fund projects on behalf of the Government of Zimbabwe. This is for 
political reasons because ‘donors are not comfortable  with pooled funds channelled 
through government’ (Interview, A2). Such a political context makes alignment to 
Zimbabwe’s systems difﬁcult—which systems donors consider weak and unreliable. Mistrust 
between donors and the government ‘makes the management of the trust fund complex’ 
(Interview, A23). As such, ‘the Zim-Fund projects are to a larger extent designed to suit donor 
needs’ (Interview, A10). 
 
However, a government economist likened the situation to a ‘taxi driver (the AfDB and 
donors) and passenger (government), with the latter giving directions though not driving’ 
(Interview, A8). The identiﬁcation of the projects ‘followed a discussion facilitated by the 
AfDB, with government included somehow, though government did not play a leading role’ 
(Interview, A20). The process of designing projects ‘happened very quick and fast, and 
dialogue with government to deﬁne the priorities was probably not given enough time’ 
(Interview, A21). In terms of project design, ‘the Ministry of Finance prepares projects in 
consultation with line ministries and submits the proposals to the AfDB’ (Interview, A15). 
Despite this, the researcher could not ﬁnd any evidence of documents to support this 
assertion. Rather, ‘donors have to a larger extent been involved in project design evidenced by 
some donors (UK, Australia, and Denmark) who engaged technical experts to assist the 
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project design stage’ (Interview, A1). Actual project implementation rests on two 
implementing entities. The ‘complicated structure of project management [with numerous 
actors and layers] was the overt design of the project’ (Interview, A6), something that 
government could not change. Such a design, however, undermines recipient country 
systems. Thus, ‘the Zim-Fund has to a certain extent been driven by the AfDB though the 
Bank is supposed to be the facilitator’ (Interview, A21). This was attributed largely to the 
blurred division of labour between government and the AfDB, with the latter acting on behalf 
of government within the Zim-Fund. 
 
Government ministries are being ‘capacitated with short term consultants or specialists 
seconded by the AfDB to assist in certain areas’ (Interview, A9). This is mainly because, the 
Zim-Fund has ‘no capacity building programme aimed at government since it is difﬁcult 
to work with central government’ (Interview, A1). However, for programme sustainability, 
capacity building is critical. Capacity building happens at project level where operation 
and maintenance training is given to responsible utilities (Interviews, A15, A16 and A20). 
However, outside the Zim-Fund, the AfDB has a facility providing technical assistance to the 
Government of Zimbabwe. This include the capacity building for public and economic 
management focusing on enhancing capacity for public ﬁnance management, improved 
capacities for MTP implementation, statistical development and regional integration 
frameworks (AfDB, 2012) 8 
 
The  Zim-Fund  uses  a  separate  procurement  system  because  the  Zimbabwean 
procurement system was found to be lacking by the AfDB standards (Interviews, A15, A1, 
A21 and A10), and is constrained by the challenges facing the State Procurement Board 
(MEPIP (Ministry of Economic Planning and  Investment Promotion), 2012). However, the 
efﬁcacy of having a procurement agent based in the UK and not Zimbabwe has been queried 
(Interviews, A21, A22 and A6). The procurement arrangement is meant ‘to avoid individuals 
and companies under restrictive measures to beneﬁt from donor funds’ (Interview, A1). 
Despite engineering ﬁrms in Zimbabwe who can produce steel or metal products, the Zim-
Fund procures overseas (Interview, A18), negatively affecting local job creation. Initially, the 
Government of Zimbabwe ‘proposed joint ﬁnancing of the Zim-Fund, a move refused by 
donors arguing based on different procurement and reporting systems’ (Interview, A16). 
This is explained by ‘the Zim-Fund donors who do not have political permission from their 
governments to have direct partnership with government’ (Interview, A1). In such a 
political context, donors settled for a channel or fund manager whose procurement rules 
and regulations they trust. However, the procurement process is ‘slow and is to a larger 
extent donor-controlled leading to project delays’ (Interview, A1). 
 
The trust fund is predominantly funding water, sanitation and power generation 
infrastructure. While the Zim-Fund funding priorities are aligned to government priorities as 
stipulated in the MTP, the Zim-Fund is a complex structure whose overt design sidelines 
government in project management. Zimbabwe is a predatory state and resembles features of 
                                                          
8 Focusing on the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, three ministries (finance, economic planning and regional integration) and the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. 
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state capture by a few politically connected elites and cronies. The main political party that 
controls the levers in government, Zanu-PF believes in primitive accumulation and anti-
development patrimonialism (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012). Zanu-PF has control in most 
companies be it parastatals, or private entities. Some of the companies connected to Zanu- PF 
are on the US and European Union restrictive measures list, which the Zim-Fund 
procurement system was intentionally designed to circumvent. Donors pay more attention to 
politics, and some are applying political analysis to speciﬁc aspects of development 
practice (Unsworth, 2009). Politics is at the centre of the design and management of the 
Zim-Fund, with donors exerting excessive control. Donors justiﬁed such control as premised 
on the absence of political permission from their governments to have direct partnership 
with government. 
 
7.3 Harmonisation 
The Zim-Fund interface with donors is through the POC meetings. The POC is supposed to 
meet quarterly as deﬁned in the Operations Manual but ‘in practice the POC meets twice a 
year’ (Interview, A1). The POC often ‘conﬁrms what stakeholders would have agreed on 
previous POC informal meetings’ (Interview, A15). In 2012, the POC met twice in terms of 
formal meetings. Informally, the POC met six times and ‘these are the meetings where 
intensive discussions take place’ (Interview, A21). The participants of the six informal POC 
meetings were mainly donors, the AfDB (MMU) and ‘government participated in half of 
these meetings’ (Interview, A21). Such POC meetings are acting as vital means of providing 
oversight and direction to the Zim-Fund projects. However, there is no evidence  of  such  
meetings  being  used  as  a  way  of  harmonising  donor  projects  in Zimbabwe outside the 
Zim-Fund projects. 
 
Donors use a harmonised planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting system. This is 
performed through ‘donors actively involved in the  drafting of planning documents through 
workshop participation, commenting on draft documents and engaging technical experts’ 
(Interview, A16). However, ‘the Bank has been very slow in preparing a harmonised 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework since there has been an over- focus to begin 
the implementation phase’ (Interview, A21). Thus, in 2012, donors were keen in 
establishing an M&E framework to justify and legitimise further funding (Interviews, A1, 
A23, A21 and A22). Fund implementation started in December 2011, and as of August 2013, 
after the actual infrastructure rehabilitation work had commenced, there was no M&E 
framework. All donors interviewed expressed concern over the ﬁnalisation of a common 
and shared M&E framework. The Zim-Fund reporting system shows features of a 
harmonised system as similar reports are send to all the donors and partners. However, the 
harmonisation does not show signs of a planned and developed reporting system by the 
participating donors. Primarily, this is because progress reports are not standardised, as the 
reporting system is largely at the hands of the MMU, which can change the format and style 
of reporting when it deems so. 
 
At this point, focus is placed on sharing of information to donors and government as 
stipulated in the Paris Declaration. The donor co-chair meets with the Zim-Fund manager at 
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least once every month to discuss key emerging issues (Interview, A21). More so, the MMU 
prepares monthly brief reports showing projects progress and challenges, and these are 
shared to all donors and government. In the beginning, ‘the MMU produced very 
comprehensive reports which donors found not very useful’ (Interview, A2). The donor co-
chair ‘stressed the importance of a communication strategy focused towards the broader 
Zimbabwean audience and not immediate stakeholders’ (Interview, A21). At the time of 
completing ﬁeld research, a development communication strategy had been developed— 
primarily to communicate programme information to the wider public. 
 
In addition, the AfDB’s Environmental and Social Assessment procedures further guide the 
projects demonstrating inclusion of environmental and social components within the overall 
Zim-Fund guiding documents. Despite the Zim-Fund founding documents outlining key 
environmental and social issues of focus, there is evidence of wide gaps in acknowledging 
the speciﬁc contextual realities of the Zimbabwean operating environment and absence of 
clarity on how the Zim-Fund as an emergency fund was going to address environmental and 
social impacts, which were already affecting speciﬁc populations (Cleary et al., 2013). 
Contrary to planned mitigation measures, at the time of the midterm review, the Zim-Fund 
was not addressing negative environmental and social impacts to communities. 
 
The Zim-Fund is a funding mechanism that is contributing to harmonisation of donor 
activities in Zimbabwe. Through the informal and formal POC meetings, the Zim-Fund 
offers a platform for donor interface. The POC brings together seven Zim-Fund donors 
(Department for International Development, Australian Agency for International 
Development, Swedish International Cooperation Agency, German Development Bank, 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Denmark and Norway), and two observers 
(UNDP and the World Bank). Moreover, the Zim-Fund has also participated in major 
donor coordination activities such as Infrastructure Technical Review Group, and Urban 
WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) meeting with most donors in the country. This is 
an attempt to ensure harmony and alignment with other ongoing or planned 
development and rehabilitation projects. Further, through the Zim-Fund, donors have 
developed common arrangements for planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. 
 
7.4 Mutual Accountability 
Donors have been critical on the urgency of carrying out a Joint Mid-term Review (JMTR) as 
‘a way of signalling the urgency of results to the Bank’ (Interview, A21, A2, A23 and A1). 
However, for reasons that the researcher could not ascertain, the JMTR focused only on 
‘design and relevance, efﬁciency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability’ (Cleary et al., 
2013). This is despite ‘the rejection of the ﬁrst prepared JMTR based on non- compliance 
with terms of references’ (Interview, A23).9 Intentionally or inadvertently, the JMTR left 
out a detailed analysis of the Zim-Fund’s compliance with bank rules and procedures, risk 
assessment and mitigation measures, the Zim-Fund contribution to donor coordination, 
compliance with the M&E of the Fund and project, and reviewing the Framework 
                                                          
9 Joint Mid-term Review dated 30 April 2013. 
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Agreement and the Operations Manual. It can be argued that not adhering to the JMTR 
terms of references can be interpreted as showing lack of accountability. If these terms of 
references were adhered to, the JMTR could have explained information as to who is 
accountable to what and how (Muchadenyika, 2013). Nonetheless, the main ﬁndings of 
the JMTR are (Cleary et al., 2013) as follows: 
 
1. Design and relevance: The Zim-Fund is relevant thus addressing immediate 
emergency needs in an apolitical structure as demonstrated by the close proximity of 
priorities to the MTP. The design was a compromise between accommodating donors’ 
political considerations (restrictive measures) and responding urgently to the cholera 
epidemic. 
2. Efﬁciency: The layers of management within the Zim-Fund and the bank’s procedures 
meant procurement took longer resulting in delays, which constrained efﬁciency. 
3. Effectiveness: Since inception, no tangible results have been noted on the ground in the 
form of implementation. The process has been more complicated than anticipated casting 
doubts in the urgency nature of the fund. 
4. Impact: At the time of the midterm review, no impact was discernible because 
contractors, generally, had not taken possession of sites. The impact is expected to be 
visible within the timeframe remaining to the Zim-Fund. 
5. Sustainability: The Zim-Fund has a sustainable design that prioritises working with 
local authorities especially for hardware components. A major sustainability indicator for the 
Zim-Fund is its capacity to attract more donors although this has not happened. 
 
The Zim-Fund Framework Agreement has clear timelines for the Zim-Fund reporting. There 
is evidence that most reports are prepared and delivered on time. However, ‘operational 
challenges such as procurement portray a major stumbling block to reporting deadlines’ 
(Interview, A18). The reporting compliance schedule especially for Implementing Entities is 
affected by procurement delays, a condition that complicates contract management and 
project implementation. The informal POC meeting of 19 July 2012 noted that ‘despite the 
comprehensiveness of monthly and quarterly reports, there was need to ﬁnd a format 
which is more useful for quick analysis by donors’ (Informal POC meeting minutes, 19 July 
2012). 
 
The Zim-Fund monitoring processes are detached from government processes. Donors are 
even ‘not aware of government monitoring processes’ (Interview, A21). Nonetheless, the 
Government of Zimbabwe’s monitoring processes are outlined in the Government Work 
Programme and MTP. The M&E system for the Government Work Programme revolves 
on three sources of information, which are monthly ministerial  reports on progress 
according to target work plans, budget expenditure reporting, provided to or by the Ministry 
of Finance and results-based management reporting (OPM (Ofﬁce of the Prime Minister), 
2010). In addition, the MTP gives priority to Results-based Management with long-term 
strategic goals, clear key outcomes and indicators, and a feedback and reporting system 
(GoZ (Government of Zimbabwe), 2011). There has been no attempt by the Zim-Fund to 
synchronise its monitoring processes with the mentioned government processes. 
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At ministerial level, the Ministry of Finance does not directly account for the Zim-Fund 
projects to parliament as there has not been any speciﬁc report about the Zim-Fund tabled to 
the Parliament of Zimbabwe. This was conﬁrmed by all the nine government ofﬁcials 
interviewed. However, the Ministry of Finance reported to parliament about the Zim-Fund 
progress through Budget Statements for years 2012 (Sections 227, 228 and 229) (MoF 
(Ministry of Finance), 2011b) and 2013 (Section 467 and 468) (MoF (Ministry of Finance), 
2012b), and Mid-year Fiscal Reviews  for years 2011 (Sections 155–159) (MoF (Ministry of 
Finance), 2011a), 2012 (Sections 533–536) (MoF (Ministry of Finance), 2012a) and 2013 
(Sections 383–391) (MoF (Ministry of Finance), 2012b). Moreover, ‘reports from the POC 
are sent to Cabinet’ (Interview, A14). Based on these, there is sufﬁcient evidence to suggest 
that the Ministry of Finance is accountable to the legislature about Zim-Fund. 
 
Mutual accounting for results is affected by four constraints. First, the project steering 
committee does not have the power to inﬂuence project management as stakeholders 
expected. This is despite its composition of technocrats who are mainly senior government 
and local authority ofﬁcials. Second, accountability within the bank requires more scrutiny 
and analysis. For instance, to what extent does the AfDB Head of Region takes 
accountability of the Zim-Fund projects? The researcher could not ﬁnd sufﬁcient 
information to respond  to this question. However,  anecdotal evidence  points to the 
inclination that accountability to the Zim-Fund by the AfDB Head of the Region seem to be 
weak as compared with other bank programmes running in Zimbabwe. Third, the Zim-
Fund monitoring processes are detached from government processes. Fourth, the JMTR 
terms of references were not followed in entirety leaving out important information on 
accountability. 
 
7.5 Management for Results 
At the time of ﬁeld research, the Zim-Fund was using a weak performance assessment 
framework basing on a progress tracking matrix and monthly reports, which do not show 
much about performance and indicators. Such a development is ‘unexpected considering the 
AfDB’s history in project management’ (Interview, A21). Donor representatives argued 
that they are not happy with the current performance assessment framework as an M&E 
system focused on projects implementation progress is not yet developed. The informal 
POC meeting held on the 19 July 2012 underscored ‘the demand from donors, government 
ministers and beneﬁciaries to see tangible results on the ground’ (POC meeting minutes, 
19 July 2012). During a POC meeting held on the 29 December 2012, the Minister of 
Finance emphasised the ‘Government of Zimbabwe’s disappointment on the delay in the 
project implementation of the ﬁrst phase projects’ (POC meeting minutes, 29 December 
2012). Further, the minister noted with concern ‘the unacceptable low levels of disbursement 
and urged the AfDB to take stock of lessons learnt and introduce out-of-box solutions that 
would enable faster project implementation such as new formats and procedures for 
bidding processes’ (Ibid). At the same meeting, ‘donors underscored a M&E framework 
and efﬁcient reporting on results as a chief determinant to further ﬁnancial 
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commitments’ (Ibid). This can be interpreted as commitment to results by both the 
Government of Zimbabwe and donors. 
 
The POC reviews the Zim-Fund progress and provides a policy dialogue forum for the 
government, AfDB and the Zim-Fund donors. The POC gives policy guidance to the 
MMU. In 2012, ‘dialogue within the POC was donor and not government-driven though a 
better donor-government balance has been restored’ (Interview, A21). According to the 
Operations Manual, the POC meets on a quarterly basis or as often as required. In 
practice, POC meetings are infrequent and this has impacts on the management of the 
Zim-Fund projects. POC sessions were held on 19 October 2010, 21 January 2011 and 1 April 
2011; 11 April 2012 and 29 November 2012. Informal POC meetings although usually 
without government representation, are a forum where detailed discussions take place. The 
informal POC meetings held on 19 July 2012 and 26 March 2013 had detailed background 
documents, which provided the basis for discussions. 
 
Managing trust funds of a magnitude like ‘the Zim-Fund provides new experience and a 
learning process to the AfDB’ (Interview, A15). Therefore, ‘the Zim-Fund is a pilot fund for 
the AfDB explaining why donors are patient and understanding to the delays faced in the 
projects’ (Interview, A1). It seems that ‘the AfDB does not have sufﬁcient managerial capacity 
to run a complex fund like the Zim-Fund’ (Interview, A2). Despite this, donors themselves 
do not have experts on MDTFs making engagement with the Zim-Fund a learning process 
as well. The challenges faced by the bank as the fund manager were captured as ‘if the 
AfDB was a private company, donors would have sacked the implementing agency due to 
underperforming’ (Interview, A2). One can argue that donors took a calculated risk as 
improving the structure of the MMU and the fund is incremental (an ongoing process based 
on lessons learned). 
 
As of 12 June 2012; Germany, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland had not fully paid up their 
commitments. On a POC meeting held on the 29 November 2012, representatives of 
Germany and Norway informed the meeting that arrangements had been made to pay their 
pledges by the end of 2012. However, by July 2013, all donor representatives interviewed 
pointed that all donors have honoured their pledges. Thus, the Zim-Fund’s challenge was 
presented as getting new commitments and new donors. In 2011, donors could not 
disburse additional funds because the Zim-Fund was yet to commence the implementation 
phase and the message was, ‘deliver ﬁrst before we [donors] make new commitments’ 
(Interview, A21). For new ﬁnancial commitments, ‘Denmark has an additional US$20 
million budgeted for 2014 depending on the outcome of the midterm review and clearly 
demonstrated ability to accumulate and build fund operations on lessons learned so far’ 
(POC meeting minutes, 29 November 2012). Tied commitments indicate lack of conﬁdence 
with progress within the Zim-Fund. Slow progress made ‘some donors to be sceptical about 
investing additional funding to the trust fund’ (Interview, A22). 
 
The Zim-Fund show unexpected results. The performance assessment framework is weak, 
and there is no M&E framework. However, all donors and the Government of Zimbabwe 
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are keen on developing a shared M&E framework focused on implementation results. Three 
and half years after inception, the JMTR found no tangible results on the ground in the 
form of implementation. Lack of discernible implementation progress has raised concern by 
stakeholders mainly government, donors and local authorities. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
Multi-donor trust funds are a prevalent aid mechanism in fragile states as it is widely 
believed that MDTFs are aid instruments that enhance aid effectiveness in fragile states 
(World Bank, 2011; Barakat et al., 2011). However, this article challenges this assertion by 
focusing on the Zim-Fund. In particular, the article has argued that the aid effectiveness of 
MDTFs is context speciﬁc and is largely inﬂuenced by politics and the institutional 
structure of the trust fund. The inception of the Zim-Fund coincided with a weak state, 
which has been dormant in mainstream international aid management with donors opting 
working through non-state actors. This background affected the subsequent adherence of the 
Zim-Fund to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
 
In summary, the article makes four key conclusions, which can be applied to MDTFs 
elsewhere. First, political relations between recipient and donor countries are vital in the 
functioning of MDTFs. Because of restrictive measures imposed on Zimbabwe by the USA 
and the European Union, and the political stand-off facing the country; the international 
community refrained from engaging directly with the Government of Zimbabwe. Despite 
this, the inception of the Zimbabwe Multi-donor Trust Fund is a cautious re-engagement 
strategy although showing commitment of the donor community to assist the early recovery of 
Zimbabwe’s key development sectors (water, sanitation and energy). 
 
Second, the design of MDTFs affects the delivery and functioning of the trust fund. A key 
element of designing a MDTF seems to be based on an incremental basis. This is mainly 
because, in fragile states, the socio-economic and political environment is often complex 
and in a state of ﬂux. In addition, most donors and trust fund managers often lack the 
experience needed to manage MDTFs in fragile settings. Hence, trust funds often present 
a learning process in international re-engagement and aid management. At the same time, 
where there is no formal engagement arrangements between the recipient and donor 
governments; the use of neutral, acceptable and credible bodies as fund administrators is 
fundamental. This is despite that such ‘neutral’ arrangements often undermine recipient 
country systems. 
 
Third, while the legitimacy of national governments in fragile states is often contested, 
targeting legitimate and credible institutions can offer tangible and life changing results. 
Target institutions and beneﬁciaries should be governments, in principle, but in practice, 
other state institutions that still have legitimacy, for example, local authorities. Fourth, 
MDTFs focusing on the recovery of key sectors such as water, sanitation and energy have 
direct impacts to economic recovery and people’s lives. As such, the Zim-Fund is proving to 
be a key infrastructure investment fund addressing urgent and long-term service delivery 
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issues.  One  would  argue  that  MDTFs  focusing  on  infrastructure  rehabilitation  and 
development have multiple ripple effects in the reconstruction of fragile states. 
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